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Conventional disease surveillance mechanisms that
rely on passive reporting may be too slow and insensitive
to rapidly detect a large-scale infectious disease outbreak;
the reporting time from a patient’s initial symptoms to spe-
cific disease diagnosis takes days to weeks. To meet this
need, new surveillance methods are being developed.
Referred to as nontraditional or syndromic surveillance,
these new systems typically rely on prediagnostic data to
rapidly detect infectious disease outbreaks, such as those
caused by bioterrorism. Using data from a large health
maintenance organization, we discuss the development,
implementation, and evaluation of a time-series syndromic
surveillance detection algorithm for influenzalike illness in
Minnesota. 
R
apid identification of a bioterrorism-related outbreak
poses challenges to traditional public health disease
surveillance (1). At the individual level, the nonspecific
prodrome of many diseases caused by bioterrorism agents
requires the disease to be recognized by an astute clinician
(2,3). At the population level, an intentional release of a
bioterrorism agent may require that disease clusters of syn-
dromes, such as influenzalike illnesses (ILI), be recog-
nized through recently developed nontraditional
surveillance mechanisms, such as syndromic surveillance
(4–7). For instance, increases in ILI shown by syndromic
surveillance could indicate undiagnosed inhalation anthrax
or pneumonic plague. 
Various data sources can be used to construct syn-
dromic surveillance systems. Existing patient data sources,
such as emergency room chief complaints, ambulance dis-
patch data, and clinical diagnosis data, have been used
(8–12). Metadata collection systems that incorporate emer-
gency room syndromes, private practice billing codes
grouped into syndromes, and veterinary syndromes also
exist (7). Other existing data sources that are potentially
suitable for syndromic surveillance include calls to poison
control centers, over-the-counter and prescription medica-
tion sales (7,13), nurse help-line telephone logs (7,14), and
absenteeism in schools (7). In this study, we evaluate the
use of data from an ambulatory care clinic network to
detect increases of ILI using a time-series autoregressive
and cumulative sum (CUSUM)–based detection algorithm.
Methods
Data Source
Data in this study are from the HealthPartners Medical
Group (HPMG), which is a family of nonprofit Minnesota
healthcare organizations that serves approximately
240,000 patients in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan
Area. HPMG is a current partner in the National
Bioterrorism Syndromic Surveillance Demonstration
Program (12). 
Investments in technology infrastructure allow HPMG
to digitally record International Classification of Diseases,
Revision 9 (ICD-9) data from patient visits to network clin-
ics within approximately 24 hours of a patient’s initial visit.
The need to develop validated and standardized methods
for syndromic surveillance is a current challenge to the
field. A framework for evaluating syndromic surveillance
systems has been developed, which provides a general
approach to comparing and contrasting aspects of syn-
dromic surveillance systems (15). We have adapted some of
these recommendations and have identified the following
six criteria that should be satisfied before developing syn-
dromic surveillance detection algorithms: 1) data are col-
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USAlected and should exist for reasons other than bioterrorism
surveillance; 2) data should be recorded and accessible in a
recognized, consistent, and electronic format;     3) data
should be available for analysis shortly after the patient’s
initial visit; 4) sufficient historical data sources should be
available that represent a reasonably static and definable
population; 5) syndromes should be validated against exist-
ing traditional data sources; and 6) thresholds set for these
systems should achieve high sensitivity and positive pre-
dictive value. Based on the framework for evaluating syn-
dromic surveillance systems, we assess the appropriateness
of ambulatory-care encounter data from HPMG.
To satisfy the first criterion, these data are collected at
HPMG shortly after the patient’s initial visit; then identifi-
cation is removed and the data transferred to the Minnesota
Department of Health for analysis without additional work
for physicians, clinic staff, or patients. For each scheduled,
same-day, or urgent care patient encounter, ICD-9 codes
are collected, recorded, and stored in a standardized elec-
tronic format, which fulfills the second criterion. Multiple
ICD-9 codes may be recorded for each patient (e.g., 786.2
cough and 780.6 fever). The ICD-9 format consistency
allows for reliable syndrome classification and analysis.
Other possible sources of data that have been reliably clas-
sified into syndrome categories and could be used in this
type of time-series analysis include chief complaint text
fields and Health Level 7 (HL-7) messaging data (16).
ICD-9 encounter data and nonidentifying demographic
information are queried daily from the HPMG central
patient database and sent to the Minnesota Department of
Health through secure file transfer protocol. Fulfilling the
third criterion, an advanced electronic patient-tracking sys-
tem allows for >90% of the encounter data at HPMG to be
available in HPMG databases within 24 hours of the clin-
ic encounter. In addition to the daily transmitted data, his-
torical encounter data beginning in April 1999 are used in
the analysis. These historical data represent a consistently
insured population within the clinic network with minimal
immigration into or emigration from the HPMG network,
thus satisfying the fourth criterion for this type of autore-
gressive time-series analysis. Had HPMG experienced
substantial changes in its insured population, the underly-
ing statistical assumptions necessary for this analysis
would have been violated (17). Validation against a tradi-
tional data source, the fifth criterion, and the selection of
an appropriate threshold, the sixth criterion, will be dis-
cussed below in the Validation section. 
Models and Analysis
We used an autoregressive model (PROC AUTOREG)
to model the square root of the daily counts of ILI to the
HPMG clinics in a 3-year historical period (18). Sample
SAS code with tests for autocorrelation and stepwise
autoregression is provided in the online Appendix
(http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10/no10/03-
0789_app.htm). The model closely resembles ordinary lin-
ear regression, but instead of the usual regression model,
the following autoregressive error model is used:
The notation indicates that each εt is
normally and independently distributed with mean 0 and
variance σ2. By simultaneously estimating the regression
coefficients β and the autoregressive error parameters φi,
the model corrects the regression estimates for autocorre-
lation, a common problem in time-series data.
In the model, we include an indicator for weekend or
weekday, an indicator of the day as a regular or national
holiday, and indicators for a sine and cosine function for
seasonal adjustment. The model also includes a seventh-
order autoregressive error model, selected by stepwise
regression. In each case, the terms contribute significantly
to the fit of the model (p < 0.05). 
The predicted residuals from this model are then ana-
lyzed by using the cumulative sums method (PROC
CUSUM) (18,19). Initially used in the manufacturing
industry, CUSUM has been used for Salmonella surveil-
lance in the United States and for influenza surveillance in
the United Kingdom (20–22). The method has properties
making it well suited for disease outbreak detection. It can
quickly detect small shifts from the process mean, provide
estimates of when the change occurred, and estimate the
magnitude of change (17,23–25). 
Validation
Because syndromic surveillance attempts to identify
disease outbreaks before a definitive diagnosis is made,
assessing the validity of the ILI syndrome is difficult. The
actual cause of many signals generated by this system may
never be known because many patients are never request-
ed to submit specimens for laboratory testing.
We assessed the validity of the HPMG ILI syndrome
category by comparing ILI visits in the HPMG network to
deaths from pneumonia and influenza in the core seven-
county Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area over the
same time period. ICD-9 codes that describe ILI were
selected (Table). We also associated increases in ILI with
the known onset of influenza season by comparing
influenza isolates and hospital laboratory data.
System Testing 
Data pertaining to the incubation period for inhalation-
al exposure to most potential bioterrorism agents are limit-
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scenarios in which additional ICD-9 counts were added to
existing clinical data to determine the number of excess
cases necessary to trigger a signal. In an approach adapted
from Goldenberg, our hypothetical scenario uses data
gathered from the only documented large-scale aerosol
release of weapons-grade Bacillus anthracis spores (13). 
In April and May 1979, an unusual outbreak of inhala-
tional anthrax occurred in the city of Sverdlovsk in the for-
mer Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The outbreak
was originally ascribed to consuming contaminated meat,
but investigation by Soviet and international scientists sub-
sequently linked the outbreak to an accidental aerosolized
release of anthrax spores from a nearby military facility
(26). The inadvertent release, which may have contained
as little as several milligrams of spores, caused 77 con-
firmed inhalational anthrax cases and 68 deaths in 43 days. 
To test our model, we constructed three hypothetical
scenarios on the basis of data available from the
Sverdlovsk release. We made several assumptions in con-
structing these scenarios. First, a point-source release pat-
tern similar to that observed in Sverdlovsk occurs in the
downtown area of the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan
area during a weekday when most of the population is at
work. This scenario will effectively disperse exposed per-
sons to most clinics in the HPMG network, if one assumes
that exposed persons will seek care at a clinic near their
residence. Second, a subset of those exposed to the release
will visit an HPMG clinic on the date of symptom onset
and in a manner identical to those exposed in the
Sverdlovsk release. This assumption effectively replicates
the incubation periods experienced by those in the
Sverdlovsk release and adds these additional cases to the
daily totals of ILI observed in HPMG clinics. The third
assumption increases the overall numbers of patients seek-
ing care in the HPMG network from this exposure to 308
during a 43-day period, four times the number of con-
firmed ill in the Sverdlovsk release. The anthrax release
and the resulting increase in ILI were modeled for three
different time periods to determine the effect of season,
day of the week, holidays, and naturally occurring ILI on
the ability to detect the outbreak.
Results
Validation
The seasonal variation in HPMG ICD-9 ILI counts is
similar to the variation in deaths from pneumonia and
influenza in the core seven-county Minneapolis-St. Paul
metropolitan area, as reported by the Minnesota
Department of Health (Figure 1). To satisfy the fifth crite-
rion for establishing syndromic surveillance, i.e., validat-
ing syndromes against existing traditional data sources,
death data from April 10, 1999, to December 29, 2000,
were compared to ILI ICD-9 counts over the same period.
Visual comparison of these data in Figure 1 suggests that
ICD-9 ILI counts rose several weeks before the peak in
deaths. ILI syndrome validity was determined to be
acceptable, as Pearson correlation results were significant
between weekly influenza and pneumonia deaths and ILI
clinical encounters in the same week (0.41) and the previ-
ous week (0.41).
Formal calculations of sensitivity and positive predic-
tive value were not conducted in this study. Calculation of
the appropriate threshold used in the detection algorithm
was determined qualitatively by adjusting the model
parameters to detect the onset of influenza season. Figure
2 illustrates a large and continuous signal that was retro-
spectively observed beginning on December 12, 2000, and
continuing until December 25, 2000. This alarm corre-
sponds to a large ILI outbreak in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
metropolitan area and was possibly associated with
increased influenza Aand respiratory syncytial virus infec-
tion. A hospital in the HPMG network reported above
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to these organisms during December 2000 and January
2001.
System Testing
The hypothetical anthrax release was modeled at three
different time periods beginning June 26, 2001, December
17, 2001, and April 1, 2002. The threshold for CUSUM in
each scenario was calculated as 1.1812, which resulted in
an average-run-length of 50. The outbreak that began in
June was detected on June 30, 4 days after the release, with
a CUSUM value of 3.09 and after 30 outbreak-associated
ILI patients (11.9% increase above expected) visited the
HPMG clinic network (Figure 3). The December outbreak
was detected 7 days after the release with a CUSUM value
of 2.33 and 130 outbreak-associated ILI patients (12.4%
increase above expected) (Figure 4). The April outbreak
was detected 5 days after the release with a CUSUM value
of 2.00 and an additional 45 outbreak-associated patients
with ILI (11.7% increase above expected) recorded in the
clinic network (Figure 5). 
Discussion
Based on the six criteria we propose, we have attempt-
ed to construct a time-series syndromic surveillance sys-
tem capable of detecting a bioterrorism or other public
health event against the background of normal ILI clinic
visits. Patient use patterns and seasonality have a consid-
erable effect on the distribution of the dataset, an effect
that must be considered when designing the autoregressive
model. 
Because the HPMG network offers same-day schedul-
ing for its members, many patients do not seek care on the
weekend, when only urgent care facilities are open. This
delay results in an increased caseload on Monday, a situa-
tion that is further exacerbated on a 3-day weekend. The
distribution of data is also affected by limited clinic access
associated with holidays. The HPMG clinic network oper-
ates at a reduced capacity on New Year’s Day, Memorial
Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day,
Christmas Eve Day, and Christmas Day. These holidays
often occur on different days of the week from year to year,
and therefore generate lower-than-expected counts in the
dataset. Additionally, ILI events occur with greater
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Figure 1. Weekly totals of HealthPartners Medical Group influen-
zalike illness ICD-9 counts (solid line) and Minneapolis-St. Paul
metropolitan area weekly influenza and pneumonia deaths (bro-
ken line) April 10, 1999, through December 29, 2000. 
Figure 2. Cumulative sum (CUSUM) chart signaling a significant
signal corresponding to a confirmed influenza A outbreak occur-
ring December 2000 and January 2001. CUSUM decision interval
(horizontal broken line); CUSUM chart signals 24 days earlier
when the analysis is stratified by age: >65 years (dotted line) and
all ages (solid line).
Figure 3. Cumulative sum (CUSUM) control chart of a hypothetical
anthrax release occurring June 26, 2001. CUSUM of the residuals
(broken line) is charted over the observed number of influenzalike
(ILI) visits to the HealthPartners Medical Group (gray bars) and the
additional outbreak-associated ILI cases (white bars). The system
threshold, the CUSUM decision interval (solid line), is exceeded on
June 30 and remains above threshold until July 9. With relatively
low levels of ILI occurring in the summer months, this scenario
demonstrates the ability of the system to detect increased ILI visits
on weekdays and over the Fourth of July holiday.frequency in the winter, which generates a seasonal effect
associated with the HPMG ICD-9 data.
Figure 1 shows general agreement between the distri-
bution of ILI in the HPMG clinic network and influenza
and pneumonia deaths in the greater metropolitan area dur-
ing the same period. In the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropol-
itan area, a lag of 1 to 2 weeks occurs between time of
initial signs and symptoms for ILI in HPMG clinics and an
increase in influenza and pneumonia related deaths. This
lag is less than that noted in other studies (27). 
Influenza season in Minnesota is variable; onset ranges
from early October through mid-January. Figure 2 illus-
trates a large, sustained increase of ILI beginning
December 12, 2000. The Minnesota Department of Health
Public Health Laboratory confirmed the season’s first pos-
itive influenza isolate on December 13, 2000. This signal
suggests that the rapid detection of ILI in the community is
attainable by monitoring ICD-9 counts representative of
ILI in a clinic network. When persons >65 years of age
were separated into a distinct ILI syndrome category, a sta-
tistically significant signal is observed from November 18
to November 20. This increase in the >65-year category
precedes the relatively large signal in the general popula-
tion by approximately 3 weeks, demonstrating the utility
of analyzing subsets of the patients as possible sentinel
populations.
The ability of the system to detect additional bioterror-
ism-related cases is apparent in the hypothetical scenarios
illustrated in Figures 3, 4, and 5. When background levels
of ILI are relatively low, the system quickly detected addi-
tional cases associated with the anthrax release. At best,
the system detected the outbreak only 2 days after the first
case-patients began to visit the clinics. In winter months,
when background ILI is higher, the system was slower to
detect the outbreak-associated cases. In December 2001, a
5-day delay occurred between the appearance of sympto-
matic patients to the clinics and the recognition of the out-
break by the system. Twenty-five additional patients were
seen at clinics on December 24, 2001, a holiday, and the
system calculated a significant CUSUM alarm of 4.48. The
ability of this system to detect the outbreak-associated
cases at different times of the year, on weekends, and on
holidays shows that the autoregressive model adequately
controls for variance and autocorrelation in the dataset. 
These scenarios demonstrate that the system possesses
the ability to detect the cumulative sum of a small amount
of additional counts. The practical success of this surveil-
lance system is limited only by the availability and quality
of the source data.
Conclusion
We have established criteria necessary for initiating
syndromic surveillance for ILI and have demonstrated the
effectiveness of our detection algorithm by using proxy
data for a bioterrorism agent release and historical data for
influenza. We believe that this approach to syndromic sur-
veillance is useful in detecting increases in ILI. 
Mr. Miller is an epidemiologist in the Acute Disease
Investigation and Control Section at the Minnesota Department
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Figure 4. Cumulative sum (CUSUM) control chart of a hypothetical
anthrax release occurring December 17, 2001. CUSUM of the
residuals (broken line) is charted over the observed number of
influenzalike (ILI) visits to the HealthPartners Medical Group (gray
bars) and the additional outbreak-associated ILI cases (white
bars). The system threshold, the CUSUM decision interval (solid
line), is exceeded on December 24 and remains above threshold
until December 30. With high levels of ILI occurring in the winter
months, this scenario demonstrates the ability of the system to
detect increased ILI visits during influenza season and over the
winter holidays.
Figure 5. Cumulative sum (CUSUM) control chart of a hypothetical
anthrax release occurring April 1, 2002. CUSUM of the residuals
(broken line) is charted over the observed number of influenzalike
(ILI) visits to the HealthPartners Medical Group (gray bars) and the
additional outbreak-associated ILI cases (white bars). The system
threshold, the CUSUM decision interval (solid line), is exceeded
on April 6 and remains above threshold until April 15. In this sce-
nario, an additional 45 cases of ILI over 5 days are necessary to
push the CUSUM above threshold. This represents an 11.7%
increase in ILI during that time period. of Health in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He is a recent graduate of
the University of Minnesota’s School of Public Health. His
research interests include healthcare data assessment and devel-
opment of nontraditional or syndromic surveillance systems.
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